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Abstract— Recent incidents of cybersecurity violations have
revealed the importance of having firewalls and other intrusion
detection systems to monitor traffic entering and leaving access
networks. But the adoption of such security measures is often
stymied by ‘free-riding’ effects and ‘shortsightedness’ among
Internet service providers (ISPs). In this work, we develop an
analytical framework that not only accounts for these issues
but also incorporates technological factors, like asymmetries
in the performance of bidirectional firewalls. Results on the
equilibrium adoption and stability are presented, along with
detailed analysis on several policy issues related to social
welfare, price of anarchy, and price of shortsightedness.
I. INTRODUCTION
The growing incidents of information security breaches
and attacks, presumably by both state (e.g., Stuxnet) and
non-state actors (e.g., Anonymous) on various Government,
ISP (Internet Service Providers), and e-commerce networks
have heightened the need for such institutions to adopt
effective security measures. Cybersecurity has already been
identified as “one of the most serious economic and national
security threats” by the US Government in creating its
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) [1].
Nevertheless, the practical problem of security adoption
faces several technological (e.g., firewall performance re-
quirements), economic (e.g., costs of protection), and policy
(e.g., regulating social welfare) challenges.
Our work addresses these issues in the context of adoption
of asymmetric, bidirectional firewalls by autonomous sys-
tems (e.g., ISPs) in the Internet. We calculate the equilibrium
adoption level(s) and their stability in terms of the measur-
able specifications of a firewall, and analyze how factors like
shortsightedness in the adoption decisions of ISPs impact the
overall security of such systems of interconnected networks.
Our work provides insights for both policy guidelines and
marketing of future firewalls, some of which are listed below:
• In general, the equilibrium levels of adoption is not unique
and depend on the initial seeding of the firewalls. However,
for a given initial seeding, the equilibrium is unique and
stable.
• In the case of asymmetric bidirectional firewalls, perfor-
mance improvements in identifying and blocking outgoing
threats decreases the overall firewall adoption level in the
system as a consequence of the free-riding phenomenon.
• The (centralized) social optimum solution for firewall
adoption results in each ISP having an individually higher
utility compared to the decentralized equilibrium.
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• The optimum regulation on the amount of protection on
the outgoing traffic in the decentralized scenario is (rather
counter-intuitively) providing no protection at all. This is
while the optimum protection in the centralized scenario is
providing protection on the outgoing traffic as high as the
protection level on the incoming traffic. This result in turn
suggests a need for regulation of both firewalls and ISPs.
• It is possible that the shortsightedness of the ISPs can in
fact help to improve the overall security of the network. We
identify specific conditions under which shortsightedness
in the decision-making of ISPs can helps/hurts the overall
system security, by introducing the new (general) notion of
price of shortsightedness.
Related Literature: Research on network security adop-
tion is closely related to three related topics: role of network
externality, game-theoretic models for security, and epidemic
diffusion. Previous works on the adoption of network tech-
nologies [2], [3] have studied the role of network externality
on the equilibrium outcome and diffusion dynamics. Epi-
demiologists have studied free-riding’s impact on vaccination
strategies as some parents myopically choose not to vaccinate
their children if the relative risks of contacting a disease
given its current prevalence is less than the potential for
damage from the vaccine [4]. Similar results were also
reported using game-theoretic tools for modeling vaccination
games [5]–[7]. In the context of network security adoption,
game-theory has been used to analyze investments in network
security [8], [9]. Others have proposed cyber-insurance as a
complementary security mechanism [10].
Our work extends these contributions by (a) focusing on
the question of ISP-wide adoption of security measures as
opposed to individual user-level patching or cyberinsurance
provisioning, (b) modeling and analyzing the performance
of firewalls with asymmetric, bidirectional traffic monitoring
capabilities. This distinction is particularly relevant from a
policy perspective of whether a minimum performance is
required for bidirectional firewalls, especially in view of
the US Government’s CNCI [1] policy of conducting “real-
time inspection and threat-based decision-making on network
traffic entering or leaving executive branch networks,” and
(c) explicitly deriving regulation constraints for managing
the free-riding and shortsightedness of the ISPs.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
An ISP provides a gateway that connects a subnet to
the Internet. A firewall software installed by an ISP can
monitor the incoming and outgoing traffic for blocking
security breaches. Adoption of such security measures has
a stand-alone benefit for an ISP. Moreover, it can slow down
the rate of attacks and provides positive externality to the
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rest of the ISPs (adopters and non-adopters) by improving
the overall security in the network. Namely, the nodes in
other ISPs will be less likely to be targeted by an attack
originating from the subnet of the protected ISPs. However,
adoption of firewalls is not without cost: there can be a one
purchase fee, as well as recurrent usage costs such as routine
maintenance and updating, slower connection as a result of
latencies introduced by traffic monitoring, false positives and
hence the occasional blocking of the legitimate traffic, etc.
In what follows we provide a practical model that captures
the key attributes for adoption dynamics of firewalls. Note
that our goal is analyzing qualitative patterns and behavior
of adoption. Hence, we make some technical assumptions
along the way to keep the model analytically tractable.
We consider a continuous-time model with N inter-
connected ISP networks. Once an ISP purchases the firewall,
it can un-adopt it by simply disabling the firewall. Subse-
quent adoptions are performed by enabling the firewall, and
in particular, do not entail paying the firewall’s one time
purchase fee. That is, the cost of adoption only includes the
recurrent usage cost of the firewall for subsequent adoptions
of an ISP that has purchased it. Hence, we need a model
that distinguishes between the first adoption and subsequent
re-adoptions. To do this, we stratify the ISPs into three
types: (1) ISPs that have purchased and enabled the firewall;
(2) ISPs that have not purchased it; and (3) ISPs that have
purchased the firewall but have disabled it. Let the fraction
of ISPs of each of the above types at time t be x(t), y(t) and
1− x(t)− y(t), respectively. The pair (y(t),x(t)) represents
the adoption state of the network at time t.
Each ISP independently updates its decision regarding the
adoption of the firewall at independent random epochs that
occur according to a Poisson processes with rate γ . These
are the epochs at which an ISP updates its measure of the
adoption state of the network and accordingly re-evaluates
its contingent utilities. Specifically, the decisions of the ISPs
are assumed to be their best response to the current adoption
state, that is, assuming the current level is not going to
change. Let vi j(x) : [0,1] → [0,1] be the probability with
which a decision-making ISP switches from state i to j,
where i, j ∈ {n,e,d} represent the state of the ISP with
respect to adoption. We set the convention that n indicates
not purchased, e represents purchased and enabled, and d
denotes purchased but disabled. Note that vi j is a function of
x(t) only (and not y(t)), since the ISPs that have not obtained
the firewall and those that have disabled it are functionally
similar regarding the protection against threats. For large N,
the dynamics of (y(t),x(t)) is close to the solution of the
following ODE:{
y˙(t) =−γy(t)vne(t) (1)
x˙(t) = γy(t)vne(t)+ γ(1− x(t)− y(t))vde(t)− γx(t)ved(t)
The decision of the ISPs is determined by comparing the
expected utilities given each decision. Accordingly, define
Gi j(x) for i, j ∈ {n,e,d} to be the expected utility of an
ISP if it changes its adoption state from i to j given the
current fraction of ISPs with enabled firewalls is x. Simply
put, Gne(x) is the expected utility of the ISP at its decision-
making epoch if it purchases and enables the firewall, Gnn(x)
TABLE I
MAIN NOTATIONS IN THE MODEL
parameter definition
N number of ISPs
x(t) fraction of the ISPs at time t that have adopted and
enabled the firewall
y(t) fraction of the ISPs at time t that are yet to purchase
γ rate at which each ISP updates its adoption decision
Gi j expected utility of an ISP if it chooses adoption status
j given that its current adoption status is i
vi j the probability with which a decision-making ISP
switches from adoption status i to j
ρ rate at which a new intrusion attempt is launched
nI number of attackers in the network
µ rate at which a successful intrusion to a subnet is
detected and blocked
c0 one time purchase fee of the firewall
c per unit time usage cost of the firewall
C1I instantaneous cost upon a successful intrusion
C2I cost (loss/damage) per unit time of intrusion
is its expected utility if it stays yet-to-purchase, and so on.
Let c0 denote the one-time purchase fee of the firewall. We
note that Gne(x) and Gde(x) differ only in the purchase fee
of the firewall. Specifically, Gde(x) =Gne(x)+c0. Therefore,
for c0 > 0, we have Gde(x) > Gne(x). Moreover, Gnn(x) =
Gen(x), as both utilities are only associated with the expected
cost of the intrusions, which is the same for an ISP with its
firewall disabled, and an ISP that is yet to install it. Similarly,
Gdd = Ged = Gnn, and hence, without loss of generality and
for brevity, we can define GN := Gnn = Gen = Gdd = Ged .
Along the same line of arguments, we define GE ′ := Gee =
Gde and GE := Gne.
The introduction of GN , GE ′ and GE leads to the following
decision rules in (1): If GE ′(x(t)) 6= GE(x(t)), then ved =
1GE′ (x(t))>GE (x(t)) and vde(x(t))= 1−ved(x(t)). If GE ′(x(t))=
GE(x(t)), then the ISP is indifferent between enabling and
disabling the firewall and hence ved ,vde ∈ [0,1]. Similar
comments apply to vne and ven. A list of our main notations
is provided in Table I.
A. Finding the Equilibrium Points
In order to obtain the equilibrium solutions (fixed points)
of the adoption process as described by (1), we need to derive
the utility functions GN(x), GE(x), and GE ′(x). As mentioned
before, GE ′(x) =GE(x)+c0. Hence, we focus on calculating
GN(x) and GE(x). Along the way of calculations, some
auxiliary symbols are defined to replace lengthy expressions.
A list of the most important ones is provided in Table III for
ease of access.
Let c be the cost per unit time of using the firewall incurred
by an adopter ISP due to maintenance, communication laten-
cies, false positives, etc. Note that c differs from c0, i.e. the
single-time purchase fee to obtain the firewall. For simplicity
of exposition, we consider security breaches that do not
propagate in the network. For example, we will not consider
attacks involving self-replicating malicious codes (known as
TABLE II
SUCCESS PROBABILITIES OF AN INTRUSION ATTEMPT
Host’s ISP
Protected Not Protected
Attacker’s ISP
Protected pi1 Π1
Not Protected pi0 Π0
worms) in this article. Hacking is a typical example of a non-
replicating type of attack. We will refer to such attacks by the
umbrella term of intrusion attempts. When a host in a subnet
of an ISP is compromised, the ISP incurs an instantaneous
cost of C1I and a per unit cost of C2I that persist as long as
the host is infiltrated. The instantaneous cost may reflect the
losses due to exposure of private information or manipulation
of data, while the per unit time cost can represent the
accumulation of eavesdropped data, accessing the network
at the cost of the victim, slowdown of the victim’s machine
or the ISP’s service, etc. The time it takes to remove the
infection is according to an exponential random variable with
rate µ . Machines are again susceptible to future attacks, since
new attacks are likely to exploit new techniques.
Without prior knowledge, new security breaches can origi-
nate from the subnet of any of the ISPs. We assume that ISPs
are homogeneous, that is, they assign the same parameters
for costs and have similar subnet sizes, furthermore, that a
target of an intrusion is chosen uniformly randomly from the
space of IP addresses. These along with the assumption of
homogeneous sizes of the subnets, imply that the target is
equally likely to belong to the subnet of any of the ISPs.
The success probability of an intrusion attempt depends in
part on the status of the ISPs of the attacker as well as the
ISP of the target with regard to the adoption of the firewall.1
Specifically, the highest chance of intrusion success is when
neither of the ISPs have enabled the firewall, while the lowest
likelihood is when both ISPs have (obtained and) enabled
it. Based on the four different conditions for the adoption
status of the ISPs of an attacker and its target, we define
intrusion success probabilities pi0, pi1, Π0 and Π1 according
to Table II. Namely, pi1 is the success probability of intrusion
if both ISPs have enabled firewalls in place, pi1 is the success
probability of an intrusion if only the target’s ISP has adopted
the firewall, and so forth.
Without loss of generality, we let Π0 = 1 and only consider
the attempts that are successful in the absence of any firewall.
However, we continue to use the notation Π0 in our formu-
lation for presentation purposes. In general, the following
ordering holds for the intrusion success probabilities:
0≤ pi1 ≤ pi0 ≤Π1 ≤Π0 ≤ 1.
That Π0 is the largest of the group is obvious, as it is
the probability of success of an intrusion if no firewall is
set up on both ISPs of the attacker and target (hence the
most exposed scenario). pi0 ≤Π1, since the primary goal of
the firewall is to protect the subnet against the incoming
threats and hence, a marketable firewall provides no less
1Note that intermediate routers do not monitor for threats and the only
traffic monitoring for threats are at border (edge) ISPs.
protection against the incoming threats than against the
outgoing threats. pi1 ≤ pi0, as pi1 is the success probability
of an intrusion that has to bypass both firewalls of its own
subnet’s ISP and of the ISP of the victim’s machine, while
pi0 is the success probability of an intrusion that only has to
bypass the firewall of the victim’s ISP.
For a firewall whose mechanism of intrusion prevention
is only signature-based, if both firewalls have access to the
same signature database then pi1 = pi0, that is, if an intrusion
can successfully bypass one of the firewalls, it will be able
to bypass the other one as well. We will refer to this case
as the mutually inclusive scenario. However, it could be that
one of the firewalls is more up-to-date than the other, hence it
is likely that pi1 < pi0. Also, anomaly detection mechanisms
are in essence probabilistic and they have a false negative
chance. The past traffic history of the two ISPs differ, hence
the blocking events of the two firewalls may not be exactly
mutually inclusive. In case the intrusion prevention outcomes
of the firewalls are mutually independent, for Π0 = 1, we
have pi1 = pi0Π1. Hence, we have the following additional
structural inequality:
0≤ pi0Π1 ≤ pi1. (2)
New mechanisms are proposed in which the firewalls in
different ISPs “co-operate” to improve their detection and
blocking chances (e.g. [11]). In such cases, it is possible for
pi1 to be less than pi0Π1. We, however, do not consider such
cases in the current article.
In our model, we assume that new intrusion attempts are
initiated at a rate ρ after independent and exponentially
distributed time intervals. Let nI be the number of active at-
tackers in the network, which we assume to be fixed. Hence,
nIρ is the rate of all incidents of successful intrusion attempts
when no firewall is present. Note that although estimating nI
and ρ is difficult, nIρ/N can be readily estimated by each
ISP, since it is the rate of successful intrusion attempts on a
single ISP when the firewall is absent, and as we will see,
that is indeed what appears in the expression for the utilities
of each ISP. The rest of the parameters of the problem, such
as c0, c, C1I , C2I , etc., are also assumed to be publicly known.
The utility of an ISP is a decreasing function of costs and
losses due to potential future intrusions to its subnet. For ease
of calculations, we assume risk-neutral ISPs. Hence, we can
directly take the negative of the costs to be the ISPs’ utility.
Let σ(t) represent the state of the decision-taking ISP with
respect to the intrusion, that is, σ(t) = 1/0 indicates that the
ISP’s subnet is intruded/not intruded at time t. Without loss
of generality (achieved by shifting the time coordinate) we
can let t = 0. Now, GN can be computed as follows:
GN = ∑
i∈{0,1}
(GN | σ(0) = i)P{σ(0) = i}. (3)
Define: A :=−(GN | σ(0) = 1) , B :=−(GN | σ(0) = 0) .
In words, A (B) is the conditional expected cost of non-
adoption given that a node in the subnet of the ISP is cur-
rently intruded (not intruded). At a decision making epoch,
the ISP may not be aware of an ongoing successful intrusion.
As we stated before, a successful intrusion is detected, and
then immediately blocked, after an exponentially random
TABLE III
DEFINITION OF THE MAIN AUXILIARY COEFFICIENTS
coefficient definition
a (C1I(r+µ)+C2I)/r
η
nIρ
N
(Π1x+Π0(1− x))
Λ
nIρ
N
delay with rate µ . To introduce a measure of the short-
sightedness (or impatience) of the ISP, we use the discount
factor r: higher values of r imply a greater degree of short-
sightedness. Hence, we have:
A =C1I +
∫ ∞
0
e−µtµ dt
(∫ t
0
e−rτC2I dτ+ e−rtB
)
=C1I +
C2I
µ+ r
+
µB
µ+ r
.
(4)
On the other hand:
B =
∫ ∞
0
P{σ(τ) = 0,0≤ τ ≤ t}nIρ
N
(Π1x+Π0(1− x))Ae−rt dt
=
∫ ∞
0
[
∑∞i=0 e−nIρt(nIρt)i
(N−1
N +
x(1−Π1)
N
(1−x)(1−Π0)
N
)i
/i!
]
×
nIρ
N (Π1x+Π0(1− x))Ae−rt dt.
Let η :=
nIρ
N
(Π1x+Π0(1− x)). Then:
B =
∫ ∞
0
e−ηνηe−rνAdν =
η
r+η
A. (5)
From (4) and (5), we get:
A =C1I +
C2I
µ+ r
+
µ
r+µ
· η
r+η
A
⇒ A =
C1I +
C2I
µ+r
1− µη(r+µ)(r+η)
=
a(r+η)
r+µ+η
, B =
aη
r+µ+η
, (6)
where a := (C1I(r+µ)+C2I)/r (listed in Table III). Now,
since as we assumed the ISPs make their decision as a best
response the current level of adoption assuming it will not
change, the probability of being intruded or not intruded that
they assign themselves comes from the stationary distribution
associated with the current level of adoption. Hence, from
renewal theory:
P{σ(1) = 1}=
nI
N ρ(xΠ1+(1− x)Π0)
µ+ nIN ρ(xΠ1+(1− x)Π0)
=
η
η+µ
(7)
P{σ(0) = 0}= µ
µ+ nIN ρ(xΠ1+(1− x)Π0)
=
µ
η+µ
(8)
Take Λ :=
ρnI
N
, which we refer to as the intensity of intrusion
attempts. Combining (3), (6), (7), (8) yields:
GN(x) =− a(r+η)η
(r+µ+η)(η+µ)
− aηµ
(r+µ+η)(η+µ)
=− aη
µ+η
=−a Λ(Π1x+Π0(1− x))
µ+Λ(Π1x+Π0(1− x)) (9)
Calculation of the GE(x) is now straightforward: there
are two components, first one is the cost of adoption, that
is simply c0 +
c
r
, and the other component is the cost of
intrusion, whose calculation follows the same steps as in
GN(x) except for accordingly changing the probabilities of
successful intrusion. Hence, we can directly deduce:
GE(x) =−c0− cr −a
Λ(pi1x+pi0(1− x))
µ+Λ(pi1x+pi0(1− x)) (10)
A straightforward yet important property of the expected
utilities is that they are (both) increasing in the value of x:
Lemma 2.1: For any x∈ [0,1] we have: ∂GN(x)
∂x
,
∂GE(x)
∂x
,
∂GE ′(x)
x
≥ 0. The equality holds only if Π1 =Π0.
Hence, positive externality exists for both adopters and non-
adopters. Moreover, the positive externalities vanish only
when there is no protection against the outgoing threats.
B. Multiplicity/Uniqueness and Stability of the Equilibrium
We start this section with a lemma that we will use
multiple times.
Lemma 2.2: For non-cooperating firewalls (hence in-
equality (2)) and when Π1 < Π0, D(x) :=
d
dx
(GE(x) −
GN(x))< 0 at any point x ∈ [0,1].
Note that this lemma also implies
d
dx
(GE ′(x)−GN(x))< 0
for any x ∈ [0,1], since GE ′(x) = GE(x)+ c0. Also, for the
case of Π1 = Π0, we have pi1 = pi0. This leads to D(x) = 0
for all x.
Proof: From (9) and (10) we have:
D(x) =
d
dx
(GE(x)−GN(x)) = µaΛ× (11)[
(pi0−pi1)
[µ+Λ(pi1x+pi0(1− x))]2 −
(Π0−Π1)
[µ+Λ(Π1x+Π0(1− x))]2
]
Recall that without loss of generality, we can let Π0 = 1 and
hence, we have the inequality in (2), that is, pi0Π1 ≤ pi1 ≤ pi0.
Let φ(pi0,pi1) :=
[
(pi0−pi1)
[µ+Λ(pi1x+pi0(1− x))]2
]
. Now, con-
sider the following maximization problem:
max
pi1,pi0
φ(pi0,pi1) s.t. Π1pi0 ≤ pi1 ≤ pi0 ≤Π1
For any fixed value of pi0, φ(pi0,pi1) is strictly decreasing in
pi1. Also, for any fixed value of pi1, φ(pi0,pi1) is strictly in-
creasing in pi0. Hence, the maximum of φ(pi0,pi1) is achieved
at the extreme point of (Π1,Π21). Therefore, from (11):
D≤ (1−Π1){ Π1
[µ+ΛΠ1 (Π1x+(1− x))]2
− 1
[µ+Λ(Π1x+(1− x))]2
}
Now, consider the functionψ(y)=
y
[µ+Λy(Π1x+(1− x))]2 .
This function is strictly increasing for y ≥ 0. In particular,
ψ(Π1)<ψ(1) for Π1 < 1. Referring to (11), we have shown
D(x)< 0 for all 0≤ x≤ 1.
Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 have an important corollary: GE(x)
and GE ′(x) each can cross GN(x) at most once in the interval
of (0,1). Recalling that for c0 > 0 GE(x) < GE ′(x), in the
most general case, we can introduce ζ and ζ ′ as following:
∃ζ & ζ ′, 0 < ζ < ζ ′ < 1, s.t. :
GN(x)< GE(x)< GE ′(x) for x ∈ [0,ζ )
GE(x)< GN(x)< GE ′(x) for x ∈ (ζ ,ζ ′)
GE(x)< GE ′(x)< GN(x) for x ∈ (ζ ′,1]
The extension to other special cases is straightforward.2
Equilibrium points are derived by equating both x˙ and y˙ in (1)
to zero. y˙(t) = 0 yields y∗ = 0 or v01 = 0. Hence:
x˙(t) = 0⇔
{
y∗ = 0 & γ(1− x∗)v0′1− γx∗v10′ = 0
v01 = 0 & γ(1− x∗− y∗)v0′1− γx∗v10′ = 0
This leads to:
y∗ = 0,x∗ = 1,GE ′(1)> GN(1)← unacceptable
y∗ = 0,x∗ = 0,GE ′(0)< GN(0)← unacceptable
y∗ = 0,x∗ = ζ ′
GN(x∗)> GE(x∗),x∗+ y∗ = 1,GE ′(x∗)> GN(x∗)
⇒ x∗ ∈ (ζ ,ζ ′),y∗ = 1− x∗
GN(x∗)> GE(x∗),GE ′(x∗) = GN(x∗)
⇒ x∗ = ζ ′,y∗ ∈ [0,1−ζ ′]
GN(x∗)> GE(x∗),GN(x∗)> GE ′(x∗),x∗ = 0← unacceptable
In brief, the equilibrium point is not unique. First, note
that any point (y∗,x∗) for x∗ ∈ (ζ ,ζ ′) and y∗ = 1− x∗ can
be an equilibrium point. Also, (y∗,x∗) where x∗ = ζ ′ and
0 ≤ y∗ ≤ 1−ζ ′ can be equilibrium points. Which of these
equilibrium points is eventually achieved depends on the
initial condition that the system starts with. For instance,
if x(0) = x0 ∈ (ζ ,ζ ′), say by seeding the network by free
samples, then those ISPs that do not have the firewall have
no incentive to obtain it. Hence, in the equilibrium, y∗ = y0.
Now, if y0 > 1− ζ ′, then the ISPs that have the firewall
will enable it until there is no ISP with a disabled firewall,
and hence, x∗ = 1− y0. On the other hand, if y0 < 1− ζ ′,
then ISPs with firewall will progressively enable it until
x∗ = ζ ′ fraction of the ISPs have enabled their firewalls.
Subsequent ISPs with the firewall have no incentive to enable
theirs. A practically interesting case is when the system starts
with no seeding, that is (y0,x0) = (1,0). In this case x(t)
progressively rises to slightly above ζ and then the system
is locked into the point (ζ+,1−ζ+). For practical purposes,
as long as the value of the equilibrium level is concerned,
we can (and henceforth will) take (y∗,x∗) = (1− ζ ,ζ ) as
the equilibrium point for the case of (y0,x0) = (1,0). In
summary, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 2.3: If firewalls do not cooperate, then an equi-
librium point is not unique and depends on the initial value.
However, for any given initial value, the equilibrium point
is unique and stable.
2For instance, in the trivial cases such as when GE (x) > GN(x) for all
x ∈ (0,1) (sufficient to check if GE (1)> GN(1)), then the equilibrium point
of the system is the unique and stable point (y∗,x∗) = (0,1). As another
example, if GE ′ (x)<GN(x) for all x∈ (0,1) (sufficient to check if GE ′ (0)<
GN(0)) then the equilibrium point is trivially (y∗,x∗) = (1− x0− y0,0).
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Fig. 1. A sample phase portrait for the ODE of (1). Region 1 is designated
by x < ζ , x+ y≤ 1, where the ODE turns to y˙(t) =−γy(t), x˙(t) = γy(t)+
γ(1−x(t)−y(t)); Region 2 is where ζ < x < ζ ′, x+y≤ 1 and the ODE is
y˙(t) = 0, x˙(t) = γ(1− x(t)− y(t)); Region 3 is the region ζ ′ < x, x+ y≤ 1,
where the ODE is transformed to y˙(t) = 0, x˙(t) =−γx(t). All the points in
the set of (ζ ′,y) for 0 ≤ y ≤ 1−ζ ′ and (x,1− x) for ζ < x ≤ ζ ′ compose
the equilibria of the system.
Fig. 1 depicts an example phase portrait for a case in
which c0 > 0. An implication of the theorem is that when
firewalls do not cooperate, we do not have the phenomenon
of tipping point (a.k.a. critical mass), as they are associated
with unstable equilibrium points. For the rest of the paper,
we assume that the system starts from (y0,x0) = (1,0).
Moreover, without loss of generality, we assume that the
equilibrium point is non-trivial. A corollary of this assump-
tion and the assumption of starting from (y0,x0) = (1,0) is
that at the equilibrium point (y∗,x∗) (which is (1− ζ ,ζ )),
we definitely have GE(x∗)−GN(x∗) = 0.
C. The Effect of Π1 and the Phenomenon of Free-Riding
Here, we show that less protection on the outgoing traffic
by the firewall (hence a larger Π1), leads to a higher
equilibrium level of adoption. Equivalently, the more firewall
provides protection against the outgoing threats, the less
ISPs will be willing to adopt the firewall in the equilibrium.
Intuitively, with lower ability of the firewall to block the
outgoing threats, ISPs feel the need to block the incoming
threats instead of free-riding on others’ investments.3
Theorem 2.4: When firewalls do not cooperate,
∂x∗
∂Π1
> 0.
Proof: From our discussion in §II-B, for (y0,x0) =
(0,1), x∗ is the solution of GE(x) = GN(x). Define:
φ(p1, p0) := Λ+µ(p1x∗+ p0(1− x∗)). (12)
Now, we can write GE(x) = GN(x) as:
c+ rc0
C1I(µ+ r)+C2I
=
Λ
[
(Π1x∗+Π0(1− x∗))
φ(Π1,Π0)
− (pi1x
∗+pi0(1− x∗))
φ(pi1,pi0)
]
(13)
3There is a cautionary pitfall in this intuitive argument: one could argue
that as more ISPs adopt the firewall, its efficacy increases and hence it
becomes a more attractive service, leading to higher level of adoption.
To counter this argument, the lower bound on pi1 is necessary. That is,
the improvement in the efficacy of the firewall is overwhelmed by the
improvement in the efficacy of the firewall for non-adopters.
We can take the partial derivative of both sides of (13) with
respect to Π1:
0 =
1
a
D(x∗)
∂x∗
∂Π1
+
µx∗
[µ+Λ(Π1x∗+Π0(1− x∗))]2
From Lemma 2.2 in §II-B we have D(x∗)< 0. The statement
of the theorem follows.
D. Pareto-Optimum Adoption and Price of Anarchy
Here we investigate the scenario in which a social planner
can impose the choice of adoption on ISPs, and attempts
to maximize the aggregate expected utility. The optimization
problem of such central planner is the to maximize the social
utility as defined bellow:
U(x) := xGE(x)+(1− x)GN(x) (14)
We denote an optimum x by xˆ, i.e. xˆ ∈ argmaxU(x),0 ≤
x ≤ 1. If 0 < xˆ < 1, it must satisfy the following gradient
condition:
GE(xˆ)−GN(xˆ)+ [x∂GE(x)∂x +(1− x)
∂GN(x)
∂x
] |x=xˆ= 0.
For Π1 <Π0, both
∂GE(x)
∂x
and
∂GN(x)
∂x
are strictly positive
for all 0≤ x≤ 1 according to Lemma 2.1. Therefore, either
xˆ = 0, or xˆ = 1, or GE(xˆ)−GN(xˆ) < 0. Recall that x∗, the
equilibrium point if ISPs could decide themselves, satisfied
the condition GE(x∗)−GN(x∗) = 0. Also recall that for Π1 <
Π0, GE(x)−GN(x) is a strictly decreasing function of x (by
Lemma 2.2). Hence we have the following result:
Theorem 2.5: The socially optimum (planner-imposed)
level of adoption, xˆ, is always greater than the equilibrium
level of adoption, x∗. Moreover, when 0 < x∗ < 1 and Π1 <
Π0, then xˆ > x∗.
Theorem 2.5 has important corollaries: Each ISP enjoys a
higher utility in the socially optimum fraction of adoption.
This is because following Lemma 2.1, both GE(x) and GN(x)
are increasing in x and according to the theorem, xˆ ≥ x∗.
Then a question may arise as to what prevents the ISPs from
reaching this pareto-optimum level of adoption in which
everybody is better off. It is because some ISPs are more
better off than the others. Specifically, those ISPs that do not
adopt would enjoy a higher utility than those who adopt it
in the socially optimum solution. If the ISPs could freely
decide, then they stop adopting once opting out starts to
yield more utility, even though continuing to adopt will also
increase their utility (but less than opting out would increase).
The price of anarchy (PoA) is defined as the ratio of the
optimum social utility over the social utility computed for the
worst equilibrium. The price of stability (PoS) is defined in
a similar way, with the difference that the worst equilibrium
is replaced by the best equilibrium. As we showed in §II-
B, for any given initial condition, the equilibrium point in
our problem is unique, and hence, the price of anarchy and
stability (given an initial value) are the same:
PoA = PoS =
xˆGE(xˆ)+(1− xˆ)GN(xˆ)
x∗GE(x∗)+(1− x∗)GN(x∗)
For Π1 =Π0, that is, when there is no protection against the
outgoing threats, the price of anarchy is unity. In the next
section, we investigate the “best” choice of Π1 if it could be
imposed by a regulator.
III. THE PROBLEM OF A REGULATOR: SETTING THE
OPTIMUM PROTECTION ON OUTGOING TRAFFIC
We hitherto assumed that the protection level on the
outgoing traffic (and hence Π1) is a given parameter of
the firewall. In general, Π1 can be any value between Π0
(no protection) and pi0 (the same protection on the outgoing
traffic as for the incoming traffic). Recall that lesser values
of Π1 correspond to more protection against the outgoing
threats. Theoretically, developers of the firewalls can add
protection on the outgoing traffic at least as much as the
protection on the incoming traffic at no additional cost
of production. In Theorem 2.4 in §II-C, we showed that
∂x∗
∂Π1
< 0, therefore, the firewall developers have an incentive
to remove any protection against the outgoing threats to
maximize their sale.4
The regulator can set a minimum requirement on the
amount of protection against the outgoing threats relative
to the protection provided against the incoming threats by
any firewall. In the language of our model, there can be a
maximum value imposed on Π1 relative to pi0. The firewall
developers will then choose to produce firewalls with this
highest value of Π1, as following Theorem 2.4, this will lead
to the largest sales for them. A natural idea seems to put the
bound on Π1 to be equal to pi0 as it corresponds to the highest
protection against the outgoing as well as the incoming
threats. However, as we showed in Theorem 2.4, this will
lead to free-riding among the ISPs and a low equilibrium
level of adoption, hence potentially a less secure network. On
the other hand, if the bar on Π1 is Π0, then the highest level
of adoption is achieved but the amount of protection against
the outgoing threats is the weakest (nonexistent). Hence, a
choice of the “best” Π1 is a non-trivial question and depends
on the metric and the perspective used. In what follows, we
consider some of these different metrics.
A. View 1: Decentralized Social Optimum
Let us define a solution of the following optimization for
Π1, a decentralized social optimum Π1:
Π1 ∈ arg max
pi0≤Π1≤Π0
U(x∗)
where U(x∗) = x∗GE(x∗)+(1−x∗)GN(x∗), is the social util-
ity of the ISPs. We use the phrase decentralized to emphasize
that ISPs are allowed to freely choose their individual best
decision of adoption, and the system is accordingly at the
equilibrium value x∗. Assuming 0 < x∗ < 1, x∗ satisfies
GN(x∗) = GE(x∗). Hence, the above optimization is trans-
formed to:
Π1 ∈ arg max
pi0≤Π1≤Π0
GE(x∗),
or equivalently
Π1 ∈ arg max
pi0≤Π1≤Π0
GE(x) s.t. GE(x)−GN(x) = 0 (15)
4It is assumed that the firewall developers make (a small amount of) profit
on each copy of the firewall sold.
The above optimization is non-convex (due to the nonlinear
equality constraint). Nevertheless, we can observe the fol-
lowing theorem without solving the optimization.
Theorem 3.1: In non-cooperative firewalls, for the case
of pi1 = pi0 (i.e., mutually inclusive firewalls), any Π1 is a
decentralized social optimum.
In words, if the ISPs are allowed to individually take their
adoption decisions, then the optimum value of the social
utility is not affected by the level of protection imposed
on the outgoing traffic. Now, initially this might come as a
surprise; after all, the value of x∗ does change with changing
Π1. The proof of the theorem reveals why this does not affect
the value of social utility. Intuitively, it is because as Π1 is
decreased, the protection provided by the firewall improves,
however, a smaller fraction of the ISPs end up adopting the
firewall. The aggregate impact is that the overall utility in
the network stays unaffected.
Proof: In (15), for pi0 = pi1, GE(x) does not depend on
either x or Π1.
The proof may suggest that the above observation may
only hold for the case of pi1 = pi1, i.e. mutually exclusive
scenario. Recall that this is case in which the blocking
outcome of the firewalls of the intruder and of the victim are
the same, that if if an intrusion can bypass one, it can bypass
the other as well. Further investigation, however, reveals that
in fact, this result can be generalized to other scenarios too:
Theorem 3.2: In non-cooperative firewalls, for any case
of pi1 = pi0Π1 +α(pi0− pi0Π1) for an α ∈ [0,1], any Π1 is
decentralized-socially optimum.
Note that for α = 0 we have the case in which the blocking
outcomes of the two firewalls are independent of each other,
and for α = 1, the mutual inclusive case as in Theorem 3.1.
Proof: We need to show
dG1(x∗)
dΠ1
= 0. A change in
Π1 affects the utility at the equilibrium both directly (depen-
dence of GN ,GE on Π1) and indirectly through changing the
equilibrium level x∗. Hence:
dG1(x∗)
dΠ1
=
∂G1(x∗)
∂Π1
+
∂G1(x∗)
∂x∗
∂x∗
∂Π1
(16)
We have:
∂G1(x∗)
∂Π1
=µx∗ (Λ+µ (Π1x∗+Π0(1− x∗)))−2
∂G0(x∗)
∂Π1
=(µx∗
∂pi1
∂Π1
)(Λ+µ (pi1x∗+pi0(1− x∗)))−2
∂G1(x∗)
∂x∗
=− (Π0−Π1)x∗ (Λ+µ (Π1x∗+Π0(1− x∗)))−2
∂G0(x∗)
∂x∗
=− (pi0−pi1)x∗ (Λ+µ (pi1x∗+pi0(1− x∗)))−2
To calculate
∂x∗
∂Π1
, we note that from G1(x∗) = G0(x∗) we
can deduce:
∂G1(x∗)
∂Π1
+
∂G1(x∗)
∂x∗
× ∂x
∗
∂Π1
=
∂G0(x∗)
∂Π1
+
∂G0(x∗)
∂x∗
× ∂x
∗
∂Π1
⇒ ∂x
∗
∂Π1
=−
∂G1(x∗)
∂Π1
− ∂G0(x∗)∂Π1
∂G1(x∗)
∂x∗ − ∂G0(x
∗)
∂x∗
Referring to the definition of φ(p1, p0) in (12), and replacing
the terms in (16), we obtain:
dG1(x∗)
dΠ1
= φ(Π1,Π0)−2×[
µx∗−µ(Π0−Π1) x
∗
(Π0−Π1)×
µφ(Π1,Π0)−2−µ ∂pi1∂Π1 ×φ(pi1,pi0)
−2
µφ(Π1,Π0)−2−µ pi0−pi1Π0−Π1 φ(pi1,pi0)−2
]
= 0
The last equality follows because for pi1 = pi0Π1+α(pi0−
pi0Π1), we have
∂pi1
∂Π1
=
pi0−pi1
Π0−Π1 .
Theorems 3.1, 3.2 establish that if ISPs freely take their
adoption decisions, then the social optimum utility is not
affected by the level of protection on the outgoing traffic.
Hence, it is interesting to investigate other metrics of opti-
mality for Π1, as we do next.
B. View 2: Decentralized Individual Optimum
For individuals adopting the firewall, a decentralized op-
timum Π1 is given by: Π1 ∈ argmaxpi0≤Π1≤Π0 GE(x∗). For
individuals who opt out, an optimum Π1 is provided by:
Π1 ∈ argmaxpi0≤Π1≤Π0 GN(x∗). Since at equilibrium, we have
GN(x∗) = GE(x∗), solutions of the above two optimizations
are the same; and are further equal to the solution of the
social optimum utility as was shown in (15). Hence, a de-
centralized social optimum value of Π1, is also decentralized
individual optimum for all ISPs. Moreover, Theorem 3.2
applies to the decentralized individual optimum Π1 as well.
C. View 3: Decentralized Security Optimum
Since, both decentralized social and decentralized individ-
ual utilities are unaffected by the value of Π1, we define
a new metric of practical interest. One can consider only
the cost of the intrusions in the network to be the metric of
optimality. Accordingly, we define the security utility V (x)
to be the negative of the expected aggregate damage incurred
on the network as a result of the intrusions if the adoption
decisions are taken in a decentralized manner by the ISPs.
Note specifically that V (x) does not include the costs of the
adoption of the firewall. In our problem, V (x) is as follows:
V (x) = x
(
GE(x)+
c
r
+ c0
)
+(1− x)GN(x) (17)
It is easy to see that V (x) is increasing in x. Hence, in the
light of Theorem 2.5, V (xˆ) ≥ V (x∗). That is, the socially
optimum level of adoption not only provides a better aggre-
gate expected utility (by construction), it also provides better
overall network security, compared to the equilibrium level
of adoption. If we were to centrally maximize V (x), then the
optimum choice for x (denoted by x˜) would be x˜ = 1. Note
that the adopters in this case win a still higher utility than
the adopters even in the socially optimum scenario. However,
this is achieved at the cost of lower utility realization for the
non-adopters in the socially optimum choice of x (hence its
achieved aggregate expected utility is lower).
Now, as we did in the previous two subsections, we define
a decentralized security optimum Π1 to be a solution of the
following optimization problem: maxpi0≤Π1≤Π0 V (x
∗). The
socially optimum Π1 is provided by the following theorem:
Theorem 3.3: In non-cooperative firewalls, Π1 = Π0 is
decentralized security optimum choice for Π1.
Recall that Π1 =Π0(= 1) translates to the provision of no
protection on the outgoing traffic.
Proof: From Theorem 3.2, changing Π1 does not affect
the value of U(x∗). From the definition of V (x) in (17),
we have: V (x∗) = U(x∗) + x∗(c/r+ c0). Hence, a Π1 that
maximizes V (x∗) must maximize x∗(c/r+c0). For any non-
trivial firewall, we have c/r+ c0 > 0. From Theorem 2.4,
higher x∗ is achieved by increasing Π1. Therefore, Π1 =Π0
maximizes x∗, and hence V (x∗).
Theorem 3.3 is in fact a negative result: the highest security
utility in the decentralized case is achieved if the regulator
requires no protection on the outgoing traffic. Next, we
discuss how this reveals a significant inefficiency.
D. Centralized Optimum
We can consider the optimum centralized version of each
of the previous three viewpoints: social, individual and
security. For a centralized optimizer, the choice of variables
x∗ and Π1 are decoupled. For any Π1 < Π0, we have
∂GN(x)
∂x
,
∂GE(x)
∂x
> 0. Also, for any x, we have
∂GN(x)
∂Π1
< 0,
∂GE(x)
∂Π1
≤ 0. Hence, the centralized optimum value of Π1
that simultaneously maximizes U(x), V (x), GE(x), GN(x) is
Π1,min, i.e., maximum protection on the outgoing traffic. Note
that this is despite potentially different centrally optimum x
for each of these optimizations. For instance, the pair (Π1,x)
that maximizes the social utility is (Π1,min, xˆ), while the pair
(Π1,x) that maximizes the security utility is (Π1,min,1), and
it is possible to have xˆ < 1.
In the decentralized scenario, i.e. when ISPs are free to
adopt or not, maximum security utility is achieved at the cost
of eliminating the protection against the outgoing threats, as
the values of x∗ and Π1 were coupled. This suggests that
a regulation on only firewalls is inefficient, and an efficient
regulation should be on both firewalls and ISPs.
IV. THE PRICE OF SHORTSIGHTEDNESS
A. The Effect of the Discount Factor on the Equilibrium
We showed in §II-B that when the market is not seeded,
i.e. (y0,x0) = (1,0), the equilibrium fraction of the nodes
that adopt and enable the firewall is (practically) equal to
ζ , which is the solution of GE(x) = GN(x), noting that
GE(x) includes negative of the purchase fee, −c0, as well.
Recall the definition of φ as in (12), that is φ(p1, p2) :=
µ+Λ(p1x+ p0(1− x)). Taking the partial derivative of both
sides of the equation GE(x) = GN(x) w.r.t. r leads to:
c0(C1Iµ+C2I)− cC1I
[C1I(µ+ r)+C2I ]2
= µΛ
[
(pi0−pi1)
φ(pi1,pi0)2
− (Π0−Π1)
φ(Π1,Π0)2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E(x∗)
∂x∗
∂ r
In order to determine the sign of
∂x∗
∂ r
, we investigate the sign
of its coefficient, denoted by E(x∗). From (11) it follows that
E(x∗) = D(x∗)/a. From Lemma 2.2, D(x∗) < 0. Hence, we
have the following result:
Theorem 4.1: sgn
∂x∗
∂ r
= sgn(cC1I− c0(C1Iµ+C2I)).
Consider the extreme case of µ = 0, that is, a successful
intrusion is never detected. According to the theorem, in this
case, if
c0
c
<
C1I
C2I
, then
∂x∗
∂ r
> 0. That is, if the ratio of the
purchase fee to the (per unit time) usage cost of the firewall
is less than the ratio of instantaneous cost to per unit cost
of the infection, then more shortsightedness leads to higher
equilibrium levels of adoption. Intuitively, it is because ISPs
tend to see the more immediate effects more clearly (i.e.,
weigh them more). Hence in this case, where the firewall
carries a lower weight of instantaneous cost relative to per
unit cost than the infection does, the firewall becomes a more
attractive service as ISPs become more shortsighted.
B. Measuring the Price of Shortsightedness
We introduce a measure of inefficiency as a result of the
ISPs being shortsighted in their decision taking, that is, the
effect of discounting future events and hence having a bias
toward near future outcomes. To make this formal, we first
discuss the notion of a reference discount factor r0. The
expected utility associated to an achieved equilibrium can
be measured using a potentially different discount factor
from the one used by ISPs in their calculation of individual
utilities. We have used r to denote the discount factor used by
ISPs. We will use x∗(r) to represent the achieved equilibrium
level of adoption to emphasize the dependence of x∗ on the
discount factor of the ISPs. Let r0 be the discount factor
used by a referee. For instance, GE(x∗(r),r0) is the expected
r0-discounted utility of adopters in an equilibrium level x∗
where the ISPs’ discount factor is r.
We can now formally define the Price of (temporal) Short-
sightedness. The Social Price of Shortsightedness (SoPoSh)
is defined as follows:
SoPoSh(r) := lim
r0→0
U(limr→0 x∗(r),r0)
U(x∗(r),r0)
Note the dependence of SPoSh on r. Also, since we showed
x∗(r) is unique, there is no ambiguity between the choices
of equilibria. Similarly, we can define the Security Price of
Shortsightedness SePoSh(r) as V (x
∗(r→0),r0→0)
V (x∗(r),r0→0) .
Following its definition, higher prices of shortsightedness
means that from the referee’s viewpoint, shortsightedness of
the decision-takers leads to inefficiency. As r approaches 0,
these prices of shortsightedness approaches one. However,
unlike Price of Anarchy and Stability, there is no general rule
that the prices of shortsightedness is always less (or greater)
than unity. That is, depending on the parameters of the
problem, it might be “beneficial” to have less or more short-
sighted decision-takers. This has interesting policy-making
implications. In general, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 4.2: For all r, both SoPosh(r) and SePoSh(r)
are: (a) greater than one if cC1I ≥ c0(C1Iµ +C2I); (b) less
than one if cC1I ≤ c0(C1Iµ+C2I); (c) equal to one if cC1I =
c0(C1Iµ+C2I).
Proof: We present the proof for SoPoSh(r);
the proof for SePoSh(r) follows similarly. If
∂U(x∗(r),r0)
∂ r
< 0, then SoPoSh(r) > 1, and so on.
We have:
∂U(x∗(r),r0)
∂ r
=
∂U(x∗(r),r0)
∂x∗(r)
× ∂x
∗(r)
∂ r
.
U(x∗(r),r0) = x∗(r)GE(x∗(r),r0)+ (1− x∗(r))GN(x∗(r),r0),
hence:
∂U(x∗(r),r0)
∂x∗(r)
= [GE(x∗(r),r0) − GN(x∗(r),r0)] +
x∗(r)
∂GE(x∗(r),r0)
∂x∗(r)
+ (1− x∗(r))∂GN(x
∗(r),r0)
∂x∗(r)
. The first
term is positive as a consequence of Lemma 2.2. Note that
in the proof of Lemma 2.2, the specific value of r was
irrelevant. The second and third terms are also positive (at
least one of them strictly positive), as for any r0, we have
∂GN(x,r0)
∂x
,
∂GE(x,r0)
∂x
≥ 0. The theorem now follows from
Theorem 4.1.
V. CONCLUSION
We present a new analytical model for the adoption of
security measures by autonomous systems, particularly in the
context of asymmetric, bidirectional firewalls. Our analysis
provides insights into equilibrium and stability of adoption
levels as well as policy perspectives on socially optimal
outcomes, price of anarchy, and price of shortsightedness.
We highlight several interesting results, including the de-
pendence of the equilibrium adoption on the initial seeding,
how performance improvements in blocking outgoing threats
can decrease the overall firewall adoption due to free-riding,
that socially optimal solution increases every ISP’s utility,
and that shortsightedness of ISPs may sometimes help in the
overall network to become more secure. In the future, we
intend to extend this analytical model to explore the effects of
heterogeneities in the ISPs (their shortsightedness, costs and
subnet sizes) on the adoption process and seeding strategies.
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